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S  iiimiiary  findings
Due Conitrasts  tXcise  taxcs with sales taxcs, consumpl'tioln  justified as a charge for the use of roads, in,  licu  of tolls.
taxes, licenses, stamp duties, anid  other indirect taxes. He  In western Europe, they are seeCI  as progressive, as
describes differenit  types of cxcises, their relative tax  reaching the peoplc most able to pay - and incidentall
burdeLis,  and how progrcssive and economically efficient  as reducing road congestion. Criticism of such taxes
they may be.  centers on how best to attain desired goals - for
TIhe main argument for traditional excise taxes, he  example, sorting out the r-lative burdens on light and
says, is that they yield substantial revenue with relatively  heavy vehicles.
little complaiit.  A second justification is that the cost of  L.uxury  excises tend to be applied to commodities an
the cxcessive use of commodities is borne by the  services with a high income-elasticity of demand, the
purchasers, not by society at large. A third  argument is to  assumption being that thcy will reach the people best
penalize people for a commodity's use (especially  able to pay them - achieving equity without relyirg on
popilam wvith  commodities such as alcohol).  increased income taxes, which are difficult to enforce in
Arguments against traditional  excises: They tend to bc  developing countries and hurt incentives. A luxury exci
regressive, because of the low incomne  elasticity of  tax, limited to certain items, is viewed as being
dciiand,  and they place an unequal burden on families at  progressive, which a sales tax rarely is.
given income Ilrvels.  'fhcy deprive families of the funds  But if various rates apply, compliance and
for milk and other essenitial  itrms, without reducing  administration beconme  complex, and consumers may
conisumiiptioni  of taxed goods. High rates tend to increase  discriminatc amcng closely related commodities.
smuiggling  and illicit production, often of inferior, evenI  Morcover, the goods taxed are often widely used by
dangcroiis, substitutes. And thc case for them is not  lower incomc groups (sugar and kerosene are p.ime
strong, resting as it often does on moral grounds. But  examples). For these reasons, maniy  countries are
excise raxts  are sure to continue as they yield revenues  introducinlg  sales taxes, with few rates or a single rate
and are generally more acceptable than other sources of  (with exemptions), with simplified processing, and with
revenue, such as income taxes.  less ambiguity about what is or is not taxed.
Taxes on motor fuel and related motot  vehicle Ic ies
arc amorig the three most productive excises. They are
This paper -- a product of the Public  Economics  Division,  Policy  Research  Department  - is part of a larger effort in the
dcpartmient  to develop policy options to reform fiscal  systems  in developing  countries. Copies of this paper are available free
from tl,c World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Carlina Jones, room N1O-063,  extension
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- ii  -EXCISE TAXES
THE CONCEPT  OF AN EXCISE  TAX
Unlike most forms of taxation, excise taxes are not,  in their modern form, clearly
delimited from other taxes. The traditional  British  concept of an excise, still accepted in many
British  Commonwealth  countries,  was clearly  defined: an excise tax was a levy upon  production
rather than sale, imposed  only upon domestic  activ:ity  and only to commodities,  not services, at
specific rates, with quantitative  control.  The modern concept of an excise, however, is
substantiaily  broader, especially in nonCommonwealth  countries.  The basic characteristic is
application to specified commodities  or groups of commodities. The tax may apply to either
production  or sale, to domestic  outputs  or to imports  as well, with either specific  or ad valorem
rates, with either physical control (common  on alconolic  beverages and tobacco) or accounts
control. As with the traditional  British  concept, there is a definite  intent to discriminate  against
the users of the specified  goods. Excise  may apply to services  as well  as commodities,  altho' -h
in many countries  selective service  taxes are regarded as distinct from excises.
Excises  vs. Sales Taxes
Thus excises are distinguished  from sales taxes in being applied  to specified  goods, with
a limited nverall coverage, whereas typically, but not always, sales taxes apply to all goods
except those specified  as exempt.  A few sales taxes, such as that of Tanzania, specify taxed
goods and rates by tariff classification  number. In most countries  there is a sharp distinc.ion, at
law and in practice, between excises  and sales taxes, but this distinction  is not universal, nor is
the terminology.  Thus a  very broa(' excise system, such as that of Japan and the Union
government  of India, resembles  a sales tax, and a sales tax with numerous  exemptions  and a wide
range of rates (for example  Guyana) is similar to the usual excise system.  In a few countries-2  -
levies that are excises by usual definition are designated  by law as sales taxes, the states of
Nigeria being the prime example. Nevertheless,  in most countries, there is in practice a sharp
delineaticn  between  excises  and the sales tax.
Excises  vs. Consumption  Taxes
A few countries,  particularly  in the immediate  past, have  used two sets of selective  levies,
one group consisting  of excises in the usual form, the other, called consirmption  or purchase
taxes, having  a much broader  coverage  and applying  to imports  as well as domestic  production.
Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados were major examples, though the first two have now moved
(Trinidad)  or are moving (Jamaica)  to value-added  taxes.  Egypt has had a similar pattern of
indirect taxes.  Broad levies of this type will not be included in the coverage of this paper,
despite their similarity  to excises.
Excises  vs. Licenses. Stamp Duties. and Other Miscellaneous  Indirect Taxes
Most countries impose  license taxes on motor vehicles and various forms of economic
activity. These  are typically  annual, constituting  a direct charge for a certain  privilege,  and thus
are distinguished  from excises. The same is true of stamp  duties required  on various documents
in many countries, airport departure taxes, and other similar levies.
Taxes  on specified  services, while  in many  countries  distinguished  from excises,  will be
included in the concept of excises in this paper.
THE ORIGIN  OF EXCISE  TAXES
Excise taxes were among the relatively early forms of taxation, first developed  on a
significant  scale in Holland,  then introduced  in Great Britain  and other countries  in the 16th and
17th centuries.  In developing countries, however, the introduction  of excises, though partly
influenced  by the policies of the colonial  powers, occurred  primarily  when domestic  productionbegan of commodities  that had been niajror  sources  of customs  revenue,  particularly  cigarettes  and
beer, and subsequently  distilled  spirits.  Essentially  tle excises  were introduced  to protect major
revenue sources as domestic  production  replaced  importation.
THE TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCISES
Excise taxes of today fall into several rather distinct classes.
First, and usually the most productive  of revenue, are the traditional  excises: alcoholic
beverages, often with different rates on distilled spirits of various types, beer, and wine; and
tobacco products, primarily cigarettes. These are arnong  the oldest of excises,  and their use is
almost  universal  around the world. These  are deliberately  discriminatory  against  the users of the
products.
Secondly,  and of major revenue importance,  are the excises  upon motor fuel, and, in
some countries, other petroleum  products as well.  The motor fuel levies may be regarded as
charges for the use of roads, in lieu of tolls; this philosophy  (though  not universally  accepted)
is substantially  different from that of the traditional  levies.
Thirdly, in many countries, excises are applied to commodities  essentially  regarded as
"luxuries"--ones  the purchase of which is considered  to reflect ability to pay.  A secondary
motive in many developing  countries is to reduce luxury consumption  of imported goods for
foreign exchange  reasons. Included  frequently  are the sale of motor vehicles, various consumer
durables, entertainment,  transportation,  sugar, candy,  various  types of cloth.-ng,  and many  others.
Not infrequently  some commodities  are i-..iuded that can scarcely  be considered  luxuries in any
sense, such as cement, but offet considerable  revenue; they could be classified separately as
simply revenue  excises.
This classification  is important  in terms of the rationale  of the levies and administration;
the control measures  are substantiaily  different among  the three.-4  -
Apart from the type of commodity  and service  subject to tax, the contemporary  excise
systems vary in other respects,  as suggested  above.
Domestic  and Import d Goods
A number  of coun'ries still adhere to the old British concept  of an excise apply'ng only
to domestic production.
These  levies  are b ?autimes  supplemented  by equivalent  buit  separate  taxes  on importation,
adjusted as excises are changed, but not designated  as excises. Otherwise, changes in excises
require adjustments  in customs  duties to maintain  the same  degree of protection. This has been
done systematically  in some countries such as India; in others it has not.  The alternative,
common in  other parts of the world, is to  apply excises equally to  imports and domestic
production. This is the practice in most Latin A.merican  and Francopnone  African cnuntries.
Level ofQApplication  of the ExSise
Traditionally, and  still primarily, excises apply on  domestic transactions, at  the
manufacturing  level.  However, some are applied at the wholesale or retail level, the latter
inevitable with most services, and  are used with commodities in several countries, as for
example, the United States in the past, on jewelry, and currently on diesel fuel (wholesale).
Specific  vs. Ad Valorem  Rates
Typically, specific rates were used, primarily for adm nistrative  simplicity,  but in part,
with traditional excises, under the principle that the amount of tax should be the same per
physical unit (e.g., of alcohol) regardless  of the price paid.  Specific levies are still dominant,
particularly  with traditional  excises,  but many countries,  for example,  Guatemala  and Chile, use
ad valorem rates, and others use a  combination,  a  specific minimum and  an ad "alorem
supplement. This issue will be discussed  in a subsequent  section.-5-
Extent of Coverage  and Use
Some writers classify excise systems into three classes:  limnited,  intermtdiate, and
extended, on the basis of coverage. The limited  systems, such as those of the United Statt  and
Trinidad, apply only to the traditional  commnodities  plus motor fuel and a very few other items.
The other two apply to broader ranges, the third resembling  a sales tax if the coverage  is broad
enough.
Table I indicates  the revenue importance  of excises (including  special service taxes) by
country and by region, based on the International  Monetary Fund tabulation.  Only market
economy  countries  were included. Some arbitrary classification  decisions  must be made by the
IMF staff in preparing  tables, but the figures nevertheless  give a good overall impression  of the
relative  reliance  on this form of taxation. Figures  by county are shown in Appendix  Table Al.
For all countries for which data are available  (108), the lowest income countries  show
only slightly more reliance on excises  than do the countries  in the $501-$2,000  range, basically
because  they have  less domestic  industry  and rely more heavily  on customs  duties. The countries
above show a  definitely lower percentage.  But statistical analysis shows no  meaningful
correlation between per capita GNP and reliance on excises.  For the African and Asian
countries, however, there is a definite  inverse  relationship  between  per capita GNP and reliance
on excises, a pattern also found in Central and North America.  All but one of the South
American countries show approximately  the same relative dependence  on excises.  Previous
studies of excises  as a percentage  of indirect  tax revenue  show a definite  positive- 6 -
Table  1
The Relationship  Between  Excises  as Percentage  ol
Total Tax Revenue  and GNP per Capita,
For All Countries  and by Region
Estimated  Per  Excises  as Percentage
Capita GNP  Number  of  of Total Tax
(US dollara)  Countries  Revenve
Below  500
All countries  30  14.7%
Africa  20  11.3%
Asia  8  22.3%
Europe  0  --
North and Centra!  America  1  29.9%
South America  1  7.4%
501-2000
All countries  37  13.4%
frica  I1  9.9%
Asia  8  15.8%
Europe  1  7.7%
North and Central America  11  14.9%
South America  6  14.6%
2001-6000
All countries  16  10.5%
Africa  2  0.2%
Asia  2  6.6%
Europe  4  14.1%
North and Central America  3  8.3%
South America  5  14.4%
Above 6000
All countries  25  9.4%
Africa  0  --
Asia  6  8.8%
Europe  16  10.3%
North and Central America  3  5.8%
South America  0  --
Source of Data:  International  Monetary  Fund. Goverunment  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook,
1990 (Washington: 1991).  More detailed  analysis is presented in the
article by John F. Due and Carrie Meyer, "Major Determinants  of the
Tax Structures of  Market Economy Countries, Tanzania Journal of
Economics,  Vol. I (July 1989),  pp. 47-63.-7-
Appendix tablecorrelation  between per capita GNP and the reliance on excises as a
percentage  of indirect  taxes. For the world as a whol.e,  ovic half of the countries  show a reliance
on excises as a percentage  of indi:ect taxes in a nairow range  between 27 and 29 percent.  Al
shows  the data by couniry. The highcst  group, showing  more than 30 percent of their revenue
from excises  (omitting  India because  of its reliance  on basically  a sales tax labelled  excise), are
Burundi,  Guinea-Bissau,  Pakistan,  Maldives,  and Nicaragua. Those showing  no excise revenue
are Seychelles,  Botswana,  Comoros, Oman, Kuwaii,  and Syria.
Data of revenue from various forms of exc. 's are not generally  available; the I.M.F.
volume provides figures on these categories for only a  limited sample.  On the basis of
information,  available,  however, some data ^an be given (from the early 1980s). Some  countries
obtai.a  most of their excise  revenue  from alcoholic  beverages: for example  (percentages  of vxcise
tax revenue)  Rwanda  99, Burundi  95, Guyana  70, Congo 59, Netherlands  A  ntilles 57, Belize  53,
Suriname  43, Zarnbia  41.  Zambia  in most years receives  about 18 percent of its total tax revenue
from beer alone.  Latin American countries show relatively high percentages; the Islamic
countries the least, since they prohibit or restrict the sales of alcoholic beverages.  Several
countries  depend  heavily  on tobacco  taxes: Indonesia  90, Zaire 80, Somalia  52, Morocco  44 and
Sierra Leone 44.  Several  of these are Islamic countries  with little or no reliancc on taxes on
alcoholic beverages. In a number of countries motor fuel levies are the major sources; in 14
countries they yield over half of all excise revenue.  These include (1980s data) Oman 100,
Kuwait 98, Columbia  96, Peru 91, Mexico  88, Israel 79, Costa Rica 76, Mali 74, Trinidad 72,
Argentine  69, Niger 67, Singapore  67, Chad 63, Bezswana  59.- 8 -
RELATIVE EXCISE TAX BURDENS
It is impossible  to coinpile  data on excise  taxes  relative  to prices  for developing  countries,
other than for a very small sample. Thus as a second best solution,  data are presented  in Table
2 for the OECD countries, as compiled  by the U.S. Congressional  Budget  Office, with data for
1988.
The almost universal  assumption  is that excise taxes, by adding  to the cost of producing
the particular items, will be reflected  in higher  prices, under usual competitive  conditions,  and
thus will be borne in  relation to  consumer spending on the items.  This is of course an
oversimplification,  because of the possibility of shift in factor prices as demand for the tax
products fail, particularly  in a relatively  open economy,  as demonstrated  by G. A. Hughes with
respect to Thailand. 1 Widespread  smuggling  and black markets (not reached by the tax), for
example, may prevent full shifting,  as will some price controls. Import licensing, which leads
to monopoly  pricing, may result in less than full shifting. 2 But nevertheless  it is the only
reasonable  workable  assumption.
Empirical studies of distribution  of excise tax burden by income class have been made
in a number  of countries. Many of these were sunmmarized  by Charles McLure  and Wayne
1G. A. Hughes, "A New Method  for  Estimating  the  Effects  of  Fuel
Taxes:  An Application to Thailand,"  World Bank Economic Review 1
(1986)  65-101.  Note also A. Lans Bovenberg, Indirect Taxation in
DevelopinQ Countries:  A  General Eauilibrium Approach, International
Monetary Funa Staff Papers 34 (June  1987) 333-73.
2A good discussion is  presented in the paper by Anwar Shah and John
Whalley, An Alternative View of Tax Incidence  Analysis for DeveloDina
Countries, NBER Working Paper 3375 (Cambridge,  Mass.:  National Bureau
of Economic Research), June 1990.-9  -
Table 2
Excise Taxes as Percentage  of Retail Prices, 1988
Distilled
Country  Cigarettes  Spirits  Beer  Wine  Gasoline
Australia  32.3  17  35  15  49.4
Austria  53.0  40  36  31  62.5
Belgium  64.4  56  27  27  64.7
Canada  N.A.  82  53  69  40.5
Denmark  69.2  83  50  48  75.3
Finland  N.A.  66  41  66  52.0
France  49.2  45  18  18  76.9
Germany  59.8  64  20  12  64.0
Greece  36.8  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  66.4
Iceland  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
Ireland  53.8  66  64  51  70.7
Italy  56.8  27  20  8  78.3
Japan  N.A.  23  47  22  47.0
Luxembourg  60.9  44  14  6  56.4
Netherlands  54.8  72  34  25  70.4
New Zealand  N.A.  53  30  20  51.0
Norway  N.A.  91  54  59  66.6
Portugal  58.0  8  14  8  66.0
Spain  32.8  47  15  11  65.2
Sweden  N.A.  92  34  69  62.2
Switzerland  N.A.  31  14  5  64.7
Turkey  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
United Kingdom  61.3  51  31  29  67.8
United States  30.1  45  15  12  31.5
Source:  Congressional  Budget  Office, Federal  Taxation  of Tobacco.  Alcoholic  Beverages  and Motor
Fuels (Washington: Congressional  Budget  Office, 1990.- 10-
Thirsk,3 by  Sijbren Cnossen, 4 and  by  Mukul Asher and  Anne Booth for  the  ASEAN
countries.5  One of  the  most complete recent studies is  that for  Jamaica by  Michael
Wayslenko. 6 All of these are based upon consumer  expenditure  studies, showing  expenditures
by commodities  and services by income groups, and these are by no means entirely accurate,
especially for alcoholic beverages.  It is not possible to review these studies in detail, but
summary  is possible.
A portion  of the Jamaica  study is shown in Table 3, providing  data for both excise taxes
and the portion of the consumption  tax applying  to the same  commodities,  with different income
brackets. The tax on cigarettes  and tobacco  products is clearly regressive, except in the lower
income brackets.  The tax on beer is progressive at the lowest brackets, then more or less
proportional  and regressive  at higher levels. Tax on distilled  spirits shows an irregular pattern,
with progression  at some levels  but regression  at higher  levels. All alcoholic  beverages  combined
show an overall progression  except at the higher income levels, but in an irregular fashion;
expenditures  on the lower taxed item are concentrated  in the lower income levels.  The tax on
motor fuel is proportional,  slightly  progressive  at the higher income  levels.
3Charles  McLure and Wayne Thirsk, "The Inequjty  of Taxing
Iniquity," Economic DeveloDment and Cultural Chance 26 (April  1978),
487-503.
4Sijbren  Cnossen, Excise Systems:  A Global Study of the Selective
Taxation of Goods and Services (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins Press, 1977).
5Mukul  G. Asher and Anne Booth, Indirect Taxation in ASEAN
(Singapore:  Singapore University Press, 1983).
6Michael  Wayslenko, Tax Burden in Jamaica Before and After Tax
Reform.  Jamaica Tax Structure Examination Project, Metropolitan Studies
Program, Syracuse University and Jamaica Board of Revenue  (Syracuse  and
Kingston 1987).- 11  -
Table 3
Jamaica,  Tax Burden  by Income  Groups, Excise  Taxes and General Consumption  Tax
on Goods  Also Subject  to Excises
Excises  Consi  'notion  Tax on Goods Also Sub..ct to Excises
Alcoholic  Tobacco  Motor
Inome  Decile  Cigarettes  Boor  Spirits  Income  Decile  Beverages  Products  Fuels
Under  J  $3,674  1.16  0.42  0.06  Under  J  $1,232  0.42  1.06  0.62
3,675 - 6,048  1.46  0.41  0.25  1,233  - 1,943  0.69  1.20  0.61
6,049 - 8,734  1.32  0.51  0.41  1,944 - 2,825  0.57  1.40  0.59
8,735 - 12,704  1.54  0.58  0.10  2,826 - 3,759  0.89  1.46  0.59
12,705  - 16,780  1.15  0.52  0.13  3,760 - 4,848  0.96  1.47  0.57
16,781  -21,895  1.10  0.50  0.25  4,849 - 6,336  *  1.09  1.14  0.71
21,896  -27,701  0.91  0.41  0.22  6,337 - 8,543  1.03  ..L4  0.83
27,702  - 35,882  0.80  0.41  0.16  8,544 - 12,120  1.22  0  0.97
35,883  - 54.928  0.78  0.37  0.22  12,121  - 19,995  0.79  0.Ca  1.07
Over J  $54,929  0.41  0.27  0.10  Over J  $19,996  0.82  0.59  1.20
All Households  1.06  0.44  0.19  All Households  0.85  1.10  0.78
Source Michael  Wayslenko,  Tax Burden in  Jamaica  Before  and  After Tax  Reform,  Jamaica  Tax Structure  Exanination Project,  Metropolitan  Studies  Program,
Syracuse  University  and Jamaica  Board  of Revenue  (Syracuse  and Kingston  1987).- 12 -
The general picture shown in the other studies is similar, with some exceptions.
Cigarettes: According  to virtually  all of the studies, taxes on cigarettes  are regressive.
One of the most recent studies, in Korea, shows a high degree of regressivity 7, as do studies
in industrialized  countries. There appear to be a few exceptions,  in Lebanon  and the Argentine,
and possibly  in Indonesia. The reason in these  countries  is that there are two types of cigarettes,
one much  cheaper  and subject  to a lower tax than  the other, bought  primarily  in the lower income
groups.
Beer:  Generally  shown to be regressive,  but less so than cigarettes.
Distilled spirits: Less regressive,  but some at higher levels.
Alcoholic  beverages: Overall,  possibly  progressive,  as higher income  groups  concentrate
on distilled spirits, with a high tax, lower income  groups concentrate  on beer.
Motor fuel:  The Hughes study in Thailand  and others show the tax to be regressive,
though not universally so, in developing countries.  In the United States, however, the tax
appears to be highly regressive.8
On other comunodities,  studies are limited. Entertainment  taxes appear to be progressive
(India, Philippines);  taxes on public utilities to be regressive; salt, very regressive (Lebanon);
radios, TV and refrigerators, very progressive  to middle incomes, then regressive  (Panama);
clothing,  proportional  to middle incomes,  then regressive  (Panama);  sugar, progressive  to mniddle
incomes, then regressive  (Greece).
7Peter  S. Heller, The Incidence of Taxation in  Korea, IMF Staff
Paper, DM/81/14, Feb. 15, 1981.
8U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Federal Taxation of Tobacco,
Alcoholic Beveracres  and Motor Fuel (Washington:  Congressional Budget
Office, 1990) p. 78.  This conclusion is challenged by James W. Poterba,
"Is the Gasoline Tax T.egressive?,"  NBER Working Paper 3578, (Cambridge,
Mass., National Bureau of Economic Research) January 1990, who argues
that in this instance expenditures are a better base for measuring
regressivity as so many persons in the lowest income group are there
only temporarily.- 13 -
The reference  thus far has been only to overall distribution  of burden by income class.
But the relative burden on various families  will differ substantially  according to relative use of
the taxed commodities. Thus families  with regular smokers will bear much more burden than
nonsmoking families  at given income levels; consumption  of alcoholic beverages also differs
sharply among  families, and in those developing  countries in which some families  own cars, so
will the tax on motor fuel.  There are also significant  differences between urban and rural
families  at given income levels, with a higher  burden on the former, because of  treater  relative
purchases of the taxed goods at given income  levels.
THE POSSIBILITY  OF PROGRESSIVw"Y  IN AN EXCISE  TAX SYSTEM
Since a  major complaint against excise taxes is the regressivity, governments have
frequently sought to  adjust the levies to  lessen regressivity and  if  possible to  introduce
progressivity.9
Problems in Detennining Distributional  Patterns
As suggested  in earlier sections,  there are serious  problems  in determining  the pattern of
distribution  of excise tax burdens by income  group.
First, what is the incidence  of an excise, that is, to what extent is it reflected in higher
commodity  prices and thus is borne in relation to consumer expenditures,  or instead reduces
factor incomes and thus is borne in relation to factor incomes, either in total or by certain
groups?  No scientific  answer is possible, though as suggested in an earlier section the most
common  assumption  made is that an excise  tax, as an addition  to cost, will primarily  be reflected
in the prices of the products, though there are undoubtedly  exceptions when, for example,
9one of the few extensive discussions of this question is to be
found in the volume by Sijbren Cnossen, Excise Systems (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1977) Chap. 4.- 14 -
smuggling  or black markets  prevents  full forward  shifting,  firms absorb  tax because  of monopoly
profits due to import licensing  or other causes,  or prices  of factors  specialized  to the industry  fall,
or there are broader overall shifts in commodity  and factor prices, as demonstrated  in general
equilibrium  models  of shifting. Nevertheless,  the generally  accepted  assumption  is that an excise
primarily  results in higher prices to consumers  of the commodity.
Secondly, should distribution of burden be measured in relation to consumption, or
income, and if the latter is chosen, annual  income  or lifetime  income? Since  income  is generally,
but not universally, regarded as the best measure of tax paying ability, it is most commonly
accepted as the basis for expressing the pattern of tax burden distribution.  Likewise annual
income  is usually regarded  as the appropriate  measure  of income, since  income  on a current basis
is the primary source of payment  of taxes. But there is no complete  agreement  on this issue, and
in some special circumstances,  expenditure  may be the better basis.
Thirdly, there are related questions about exactly what items should be included in
income and problems of measurement  of some forms.  Should gifts and welfare payments  be
included--though  these are not significant  in most developing  countries.  More serious is the
importance of  income in  kind in  the developing countries, products of semi subsistence
agriculture,  for example. These  are difficult  to discover  and measure, and are frequently  omitted
in tabulations. Since  this form of income  concentrates  in the lowest income  groups, figures of
tax burden as a percentage  of income  overstate  tax for these groups.
Fourthly, data on consumer expenditure  by income group are based upon consumer
expenditure  surveys,  which are by no meLiis  entirely  accurate. The family  samples  selected  may
not be fully representative. Persons often do not remember  or keep accurate records of their
expenditures  by commodity  groups.  There are definite biases on the part of many persons in
reporting expenditures  on various commodities,  particularly  alcoholic  beverages; some studies- 15 -
have shown that if purchases  reported in the sample  are expanded  to cover the entire population,
the total accounts  for only a small percentage  of the amounts  known  to be sold by distributors.
A final problem  now  widely  recognized  is that expenditure  patterns  differ sharply  between
urbar. and rural areas; some studies now have separate data for the two groups.
Circumstances  in Developing  Countries  Facilitating  Progressivity  of Excises
For several  reasons it appears  to be more feasible  to reduce  regressiviLy  of excise systems
or increase  progressivity  in developing  countries  than in industrialized  ones. In many  developing
countries, particularly the least developed ones, the economies are essentially  dualistic, with
sharply different  consurrption  patterns  in the two sectors. In the lower income  semi-subsistence
sector, much  consumption  is in kind, goods  produced  and consumer  by the family  or village,  with
little or no commercial  activity.  Even if these commodities  were subject to excises, the taxes
could not possibly  be collected. To the extent that goods  are purchased  commercially,  only the
cheapest varieties are acquired.  Thus luxury goods in the usual sense are virtually unknown.
Alcoholic beverages  are village produced,  or the cheapest  type purchased;  cigarettes  are rolled
from tobacco, motor fuel is unknown.  Consumer durables, confined to simple articles of
furniture and housewares,  are made by the family  or local groups; excises  could not possibly  be
applied.
It is thus possible to devise an excise system that will virtually exclude the rural low
income groups from the burden of the tax.  As a country develops, however, this becomes
increasingly  difficult  as the two sectors tend to merge in consumption  patterns.
The Criteria for Selection  of Commodities  for Excise Taxation
In terms of progressivity,  the basic rule is that taxes should be applied to commodities
with high income elasticity  of demand; that is, as income  rises, consumption  rises by a greater- 16 -
percentage.  A 5 percent increase in the family income, for example, will lead to a 10 or 15
percent increase in consumption  of the commodities, If this rule could  be used, personal  views
of those developing  the legislation  about  what constitutes  "luxury" spending  would be avoided.
A second rule is that the tax should be applied  to commodities  with low price elasticity,
that is,  relatively inelastic demands.  Otherwise, persons will shift from taxed to untaxed
substitutes  and little revenue  will be ob.ained,  with potential  excess  burden. This in turn requires
the taxation  of a relatively broad category of goods, since the broader the category, the less is
the chance of shifting  to substitutes.
A third requirement is that expenditures on the commodities  constitute substantial
segments  of consumption  in the higher income groups, and little in the patterns of the lower
income groups.  Unless the taxed goods are consumed in substantial amounts, the revenue
potential  will not be great enough to warrant taxation. Many excise systems single out minor
items for taxation that constitute  such a small element  in total spending that taxation under an
excise is useless. Cigarette  lighters are an example.
A  fourth requirement is  the possibility of  disaggregating  the broad categories of
commodities  in such a way that differential  rates can be applied according  to the concentration
of consumer  purchases  by income  groups. Segregation  may  be possible  by prices  charged  as with
motor vehicles  or by precise nature  of product  (octane  level  of gasoline,  for example). Examples
of these are numerous, even with traditional excises. A good example  is the much lower rate
applied to hand rolled kretak (clove) cigarettes  in Indonesia,  used primarily  in the lower income
groups,  compared  to iates on manufactured  cigarettes. The use of a much lower rate on chibuku
(unstable)  beer in Zambia,  the type  purchased  mainly  in beer halls  by the lower and lower middle
urban income  groups, relative to that on standard  beer, is another. The very high rates on wine
in Commonwealth  Caribbean  countries, compared  to that on beer, is mainly designed  to reach- 17 -
the higher income  groups, including  tourists, since  beer is the standard  drink in the lower income
groups.  Application  of much higher rates to alcoholic  beverages  of types not produced in
country and used almost solely by the higher income  groups is common, even though uniform
rates apply to domestic  and imported  products. This type of differentiation,  with the traditional
excises applying  at the manufacturing  level, is administratively  feasible.
Finally, there is strong  justification  for the use of ad valorem rates, as the amount of tax
per physical unit will be greater on the more expensive  varieties  than on the cheaper ones.
Obstacles  to Attainment  of These Obiectives
Unfortunately,  it is difficult  to implement  policies  that will  attain these objectives. First,
knowledge  of income and price elasticities of demand is limited, particularly in developing
countries.  The price elasticity will of course vary with changes  in prices of other goods; the
usual concept of price elasticity  assumes  that prices of other goods and factors are unchanged.
Secondly,  a relatively  high demand  elasticity  requires  broad coverage  of the excises,  but
his in turn may cause loss of high income  elasticity,  which may be much greater for particular
commodities  than for a group of related commodities.
Thirdly, the  disaggregation of  taxed commodity groups necessary for  increasing
progressivity  may be very difficult  to do from an operational  standpoint. Examples  have been
given in previous sections  where this is possible: machine  made vs. hand rolled cigarettes, for
example,  application  of different  rates to different  types of alcoholic  beverages  whose  purchases
are concentrated  in the different  income  groups;  various grades  of gasoline,  etc., price or physical
characteristics  of motor vehicles, etc.
But disaggregation  is not feasible with many types of commodities  in a fashion that is
operable.  Clothing, hardware, lumber, etc. are examples.  A large number of  different
subspecies  makes both compliance  and control increasingly  difficult. One of the most serious- 18 -
objections is that the requirements  could result in a number  of different excises with different
rates and operational  rules.  As a consequence,  operation  would  be seriously  complicated.
Fourthly, the requirements  would lead to rejection of application of excises to certain
commodities  which are universally  regarded  as desirable  for taxation  and 'o have  justification  on
economic  efficiency  grounds (alcohol, tobacco). The use of ad valorem rates may be contrary
to the desire to relate the tax to quantities  consumed  rather than to vall
A major implication  of these conclusions  is that an attempt to use a large number of
separate excises, disaggregated  by a particular form of the commodity  or service, would be
operationally  very difficult.
Differences  Armong  Families
Even if an excise  system  can be made progressive,  there is still an important  disadvantage
from an equity standpoint,  particularly  with the tiaditional  excises. The tax burden relative to
income  will vary greatly among  families  depending  on whether  or not the particular  commodities
are used in the family.  Relatively  heavy taxation of families in which one or more members
smoke cigarettes may be  justified on  economic efficiency grounds, but  can be  seriously
questioned  on equity grounds.
THE CHOICE  BETWEEN  AD VALOREM  VS SPECIFIC  RATES
A major issue with regard to excises is the choice between ad valorem and specific
rates. 10  The issue is particularly important  with the traditional excises and motor fuel.  For
most other excises the use of ad valorem rates is almost essential because of the problems of
10J.  A. Kay and M. J.  Keen,  The  Structure  of  Tobacco  Taxes  in  the
European Community  (London:  Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1S82);
Cnossen, Excise Systems, op. cit., pp.  104-05.- 19 -
defining  the taxable  units and establishing  suitable  relative rates--as  for example  if all hardware
items were made taxable.
Traditionally,  excises  had specific rates, and the major excises in terms of revenue still
do in many countries, though not in all.  There are several  advantages  claimed  for the specific
form of rate.
First, compliance and administration are typically simpler, as there is no  need to
determine  the value of the product  for application  of the tax. Control  involves  the relatively  easy
task of determining  physical output--numbers  of cigarettes, etc.  There is no need for audit to
check upon reported values, and there are no issues relating to the appropriate  value.  These
excises are typically collected at the manufacturing  level; application  of the tax to the actual
selling  price would encourage  manufacturers  to shift functions  forward of the point of imposition
of the tax to distributors. To avoid this, commonly  the retail  price is used.  This is not difficult
with cigarettes,  for example,  with more or less standard  retail  prices, but it is more  difficult  with
a wide range of a!coholic  beverages. In any event, it adds a complicating  element  to operation
of the tax.
Secondly,  the traditional  excises  are in part based upon a penalty philosophy--that  use of
the commodities  creates negative externalities  or,  particularly in the past, is in some sense
"immoral"  or "sinful."  Thus the specific levy ensures that the tax burden borne by consumers
will be related to the physical quantity  consumed,  not to the value.  Using U.S. wine prices as
an example,  presumably  the tax "penalty"  should  be the same  for consuming  a litre of $1.98 wine
as for consuming  one of $25 super quality wine. If anything  it might be argued  that the cheaper
wine may be more harmful, per litre, than the high quality  wine.-and  certainly  there is incentive
to use more.  This reasoning  has validity  only if one accepts the negative  externalities  penalty
and/or "sin" justification for these taxes.- 20 -
Thirdly, as demonstrated  by J. A. Kay and M. .1.  Keen, specific levies avoid the effect
of ad valorem levies in lowering  the quality of the product  and the range of varieties. With an
ad valorem levy a firm can reduce its tax liability by lowering  the quality (for example, use of
inferior materials, less aging, etc.) whereas with a specific levy it cannot  do so.  By the same
reasoning  ad valorem  rates :end  to reduce  the range of varieties  available  to the consumers,  since
provision of a number  of varieties  will raise costs relative  to meeting  the demand with a single
variety and thus an ad valorem tax will give incentive  to cut back on the number  of varieties.
It should be noted that this is an advantage  of the specific rate only if the quality and
variety  were opti? al in the absence  of the tax; if they  are not, appropriate  use of ad valorem  rates
might bring the industry closer to the optimum, but design of such a program is extremely
difficult.
A final advantage  of the specific  rate is that its use tends  to conceal  the very high tax rate
relative to purchase  price that is evident with an ad valorem rate.
The ad valo;em approach,  in turn, has some significant  advantages. First, it avoids the
penalty placed by specific rates on the lower priced varieties  of the product, and makes the tax
more progressive  or less regressive,  as noted  in a previous section. A uniform  rate of tax on all
wine places a much higher tax burden on the purchase  of the litre of cheap  wine compared  to the
purchase  of an expensive  wine.  Ad valorem levies  place a higher  burden on drinking in luxury
establishments,  for example. To many observers, this is a much more significant  matter than
possible effects of an ad valorem levy in leading  producers  to reduce  quality, given ti 1 ; demand
for and the higher prices possible on high quality varieties.  It may be possible to lessen this
regressive  feature of specific rates by varying  the rate according to the price of the product, as
some countries  do with cigarettes  and motor fuel, but this materially  complicates  operation  of the- 21 -
tax, and is contrary to the "penalty" goal of traditional  excises, or the road use philosophy of
motor fuel taxes.
Secondly,  the ad valorem  approach  eliminates  the need  for defining  the taxable  unit, since
the tax can be applied to the selling price of groups of units; a firm produces and sells a
particular batch of goods for a certain amount; tax applies  to this selling price.  There are no
problems of determining  appropriate  price necessary  if rate differentiation  is used with specific
rates.  Closely related, there is no incentive,  as with some specific levies, to "water down" the
product--for  example,  beer or distilled  spirits--if  the tax is applied  to the concentrate, which is
diluted after the tax is applied. This problem  of specification  of units is particularly  troublesome
with some types of luxury goods,  where the final product  can be sold in parts, which may or may
not be subject lo excise.
Thirdly, an.1 most seriously in many countries, specific rates do not keep pace with
inflation, as do ad valorem rates. When prices are rising, the specific  rates must be constantly
revised. Experience  in the United  States  and elsewhere  shows  that this is often not done.  There
are two primary reasons: inertia, especially  in a nonparliamentary  governmental  structure, and
political  opposition  to any tax rate increases,  even though necessary  to keep the real tax burden
constant  relative to selling  prices. This tax increase  psychosis  has become very strong in recent
years in many countries.
One of the greatest fears in many  developing  countries  considering  shift from specific to
ad valorem  rates is that the traditional  levies  are highly  productive  of revcnue,  and there is danger
that tampering  with the rate will interfere  with effective  enforcemcnt  and cause serious loss of
zevenue.- 22 -
Since the lag of rates behind  inflation  is the most serious disadvantage  of specific rates,
one approach  to the problem  is to retain the specific  rates  but to index  them automatically  to keep
them in line with price level changes.
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS
Excises  have often  been criticized  for serious  adverse  economic  effects--interference  with
attainment  of economic  optimality. The effect long stressed  is the excess burden  argument;  when
some commodities  are taxed  and not others, persons  shift from taxed to untaxed  articles,  and thus
a net excess  burden results. The persons  suffer a loss in satisfaction  but the government  gets no
revenue. Indirect taxes were often compared  unfavorably  with income taxes on this score.  But
the generality of the argument has been seriously questioned in recent years, although there
remains an element of validity. The basic argument  today following  from the theory of optimal
taxation is that when taxes are levied on particular commodities  or services, they should be
imposed  on items  with low price elasticity  of demand,  so that there will be a minimum  of shifting
of consumer  purchases. But this rule, if broadly  applied, would result in heavy  taxation  of basic
necessities  which have low price and income  elasticity. Since  these are consumed  widely  in the
lower income levels, heavy taxation  is not acceptable  in terms of equity.
Of the typical  excise taxes, those on cigarettes  and beer, and to a lesser extent those on
distilled  spirits, meet the low price elasticity requirement  relatively well, from all indications,
because of their addictive nature.  But of course this feature lessens the attainment of the
objective of these levies of offsetting  the negative externalities  by reducing use.  The tax on
motor fuel is of a somewhat  different  character; it may be regarded  as basically  a charge for the
use of roads to cover  their costs, and like  any other charge or price any reduction  in usage below
the volume with no charge may be considered  to aid in attainment  of the economic  optimum.
Failure to charge for the use of roads would result in  excessive utilization relative to the- 23 -
optimum. Excises  on polluting  effluents  would  be justified, in terms  of economic  efficiency,  for
the same reason as motor fuel levies--with  the motive of lessening  pollution.  The economic
efficiency  argument  is strongest  against  excise systems  that include  a number  of articles regarded
as luxuries. Price elasticity  may be relatively  high, especially  if close substitutes  are not taxed.
Avoidance  of Tax on Production  InRuts
The reasoning  applied to excises on consumption  goods does not apply to production
inputs, except when the tax represents  a payment for inputs (motor fuel charges  for commercial
vehicles),  or the government  deliberately  seeks  to alter factor input  ratios. The  principal  example
of the latter is a higher tax on machine-manufactured  goods than on those produced  by hand--as
the cigarette tax structure  in Indonesia,  and textile taxation  in some countries.
Apart from these special  cases, a tax on production  inputs will almost certainly  cause a
shifting  in factor proportions  away from optimal  production  efficiency. An obvious example  is
the taxation of freight transport  provided  by public carriers, which will lead business firms to
haul goods in their own vehicles  to avoid tax, and may affect location  decisions.
The Special  Cases of Motor Fuel and Related  Taxes
As noted, taxes on motor vohicles  can play a major role in financing  road construction
and maintenance  on a rational  basis, and in a developing  country, improve  the equity of the tax
structure, since relatively few persons own cars.  These levies can also yield the government
substantial  revenue.
Apart from annual license charges, which are not included in the coverage of excises,
there are two principal levies for highway  use, the tax on the initial sale of the vehicles (and
possibly upon subsequent  resale), and the motor fuel tax, plus possible supplementary  excises- 24 -
such as on vehicle tires.  It is relatively  easy to administer  an excise tax on the sale of motor
vehicles, on an ad valorem basis, with control through the licensing  system. If there is a strong
desire to hold down the size of vehicles,  the ad valorem rate can be graduated  sharply according
to weight  or engine capacity,  relatively  objective  measures. The second, and frequently  the most
important,  is the excise on motor fuel, collected  from the refinery or wholesale  distributor. In
theory, the level of the tax should  be determined  by the short run marginal  cost of maintenance
of the highways--but  given  the constant  high continuing  levels of spending  on highways  charging
a substantially  higher amount  to cover a large portion of overall highway  costs has merit.  The
tax would be collected, of course, oil sales for use by both private and commercial  vehicles.
Specific rates can be justified on the argument  that quantity  consumed,  not amount paid, is the
appropriate  measure of road use.  But indexing  of rates to offset inflation  is imperative.
Since, in most developing  countries,  there is substantial  income  elasticity  of demand for
motor fuel, the tax structure  can be made more acceptable  from an equity standpoint  by raising
the levy on noncommercial  use above  that necessary  to cover highway  cost, the additional  to be
placed in the general fund rather than the highway  fund.
One major issue, political and economic,  is the appropriate  relative burden on gasoline
and diesel fuel.  In terms of highway  financing,  the tax on diesel fuel should  be higher, because
for vehicles  of a given  weight,  less diesel  fuel is required  per mile than gasoline. But if a portion
of the levy is regarded as a regular tax and not as a charge for road use, application  of a higher
rate or the same rate on diesel fuel as on gasoline is scarcely  justified.  In fact, most countries
apply  a rate on diesel  fuel so much  lower than that on gasoline  that the difference  is greater than
that necessary to eliminate the nonhighway  tax element on gasoline.  This often results in a
burden entirely inadequate  in terms of highway  costs on the larger transport  vehicles, which are
primarily diesel.  A major problem is to confine the heavy tax on diesel fuel to that used for- 25 -
highway purposes; there is no logic to applying a higher rate, or any rate to diesel fuel for
nonhighway  use (except  perhaps to lessen imports  of petroleum). But differentiating  purchases
for highway  and nonhighway  use is very difficult  in a developing  country,  so serious that David
Newbery and others recommend  against seeking  to tax diesel fuel, using instead high taxes on
the sale of diesel vehicles.  11 Probably  the only other workable  solution  is to tax all diesel fuel
sales arw' allow application for refunds for nonhighway  use.  The same problem arises with
gasoline except that only  limited amounts are used for nonhighway purposes, mostly in
agriculture.
One aspect  of the issue  relates  to the relative  burden on heavier  vehicles, especially  trucks
(freight vehicles).  Motor fuel consumption and thus motor fuel tax does not increase in
proportion  to the greater damage  done to the roads  by the larger vehicles. Yet any form of levy
based upon weight and distance travelled is difficult to enforce; the only feasible solution is
substantially  higher annual license charges, though these are unrelated  to mileage  travelled.
While the motor fuel levy is a reasonable  measure of road use and effect on road costs,
it does not reflect congestion  costs--the  effect upon the costs of other vehicles through delay,
discomfort, and  accident hazard as  additional cars  use the  roads and the  latter become
overcrowded,  as they do in urban areas in many developing  countries. The only solution  to this
problem, in the absence  of tolls, is the requiring  of special vehicle  licenses  for persons living in
congested areas, although these are unrelated to actual usage.  Tolls are the alternative; the
problem is the cost of collection and the nuisance  and delay issue.  Of all developing  country
cities, only Singapore  has developed  a systematic  program for restriction  of congestion.
" 1David  M. Newbery, Road User Charges and the Taxation of Road
TransDort, IMF Working Paper WP/87/5, 1987.- 26 -
While beyond the scope of this paper, it is well to point out that a major method of
reducing automobile  congestion  is the provision of efficient  inexpensive  public transportation--
typically by bus, though in larger metropolitan  areas, by light rail or rapid transit systems. To
hold fares down, such vehicles should be relatively  free of highway-related  excise.
The Importance  of Uniform Treatment  of Domestic  and Imported  Goods
Histo-ically,  as noted, ir  many countries, excises  apply only to domestically  produced
goods. While compensating  import  duty increases  or supplements  were  provided,  many  countries
have not maintained a uniform relationship  between tax on the imported and domestic goods.
Not infrequently,  a higher rate was applied  to imported goods, thus adding  to protection. The
results have  been alterations  in the degree  of protection  provided,  and deliberate  use of the excise
system  to increase  protection. The  undesirable  consequences  are obvious. Haphazard  differences
between  the taxes on domestic  and imported  goods make no sense. Deliberate  use of the excise
system to increase protection has the effect of confusing  and concealing  the actual amount of
protection  provided. If a country  is to protect domestic  industry,  this should clearly  be done by
one levy--the customs  duties--not  two, customs  and excise differentials. For both political and
economic  considerations,  excises  should apply equally  to imported and domestic  goods.
This rule is simple with specific rate levies.  It is more complicated  with ad valorem
levies, because of problems of ensuring that the taxable price is the same for imported and
domestic goods, the problem that also arises with sales taxes at the manufacturing  level.  The
prices of domestic  goods  may reflect  significant  cost items not appearing  in the  prices of imported
goods--costs  of domestic  distribution,  advertising,  warranty,  etc.  Ensuring  complete  equality is
difficult, but the problem must be faced.- 27 -
EVALUATION  OF THE USE OF EXCISES
The justification  for excises  must be approached  in terms of each of the major types, as
the rationale and objections  differ substantially.
The Traditional  Levies
Perhaps the most significant case for the traditional excises is their ability to yield
substantial revenue with relatively little popular complaint.12 This reflects in part the low
price elasticity of demand, in part the rather general consensus  that they are more acceptable
forms of taxes than others, especially  income  taxes. Beyond  revenue,  the strongest  justification
rests upon negative  externalities;  use of the commodities  to excess results in costs to society not
borne by the purchasers  of the commodities. This is particularly  true of alcoholic  beverages,  but
of cigarettes  as well, given  the effects  on lung cancer, not only of the smokers  but of nonsmokers
inhaling the smoke.  The third, and perhaps oldest, argument  is the desire to place a deliberate
"penalty"  upon use of these commodities--that  their use contributes  little to the welfare  of society,
and their purchase  takes funds away from goods essential  for health and well being. This view
in part reflects the Victorian  notion that use of the commodities  is in a sense sinful, and in part
the antagonism  of Islamic countries  to the use of alcohol.
These levies, however, are not without  criticism. As noted, they tend to be regressive,
because  of the low income  elasticity  of demand  and they tend to place a very unequal burden on
families at given income levels.  A widespread  argument in some developing  countries is that
their primary effect is to deprive  the families  which  use these  commodities  of funds  for milk, and
other items essential for health,while, it is argued, the taxes have little effect in reducing
" 2A recent  discussion  is provided  by Joseph  Cordes,  Eric  Nicholson
and  Frank  Sammartino,  "Raising  Revenues  by Taxing  Activities  with  Social
Costs,"  National  Tax  Journal,  43  (Sept.  1990),  pp.  343-57.- 28 -
consumption  of the taxed goods because  of the low price elasticity. Some recent studies suggest
that the price elasticity is not negligible. 13 The high rates tend to  increase smuggling and
illicit production, often of inferior  and sometimes  dangerous  substitutes. But perhaps the most
serious objection is that the case for these levies is not strong, resting as it does on moral
judgments.  But one certain rule is that use of these excises will continue--given  their revenue
yield and general acceptance.
Motor Fuel and Motor Vehicle Levies
As noted, the tax on motor  fuel, and related  motor  vehicle  levies,  usually  one of the three
most productive  excises, has strong  justification  as a charge for the use of roads, in lieu of tolls.
Properly adjusted, the tax aids in attaining  optimal  expenditure  on roads and optimal  road use.
The other major argument, one dominant in western Europe, is that these levies are
progressive, constituting  an important  supplement  to the income tax in reaching  persons on the
basis of ability to pay, with incidental  gains of lessening  road congestion.
The only significant  criticism  centers around the problems of adjusting  the complex of
levies relating  to motor vehicles to attain  the desired  goals in optimal  fashion--particularly  with
regard to congestion,  relative  burdens on light and heavy  vehicles, relative treatment  of gasoline
and diesel fuel, and tax treatment  of diesel fuel for nonhighway  use.
Luxury Excises
The third category  of excises  consists  of those  designed  to reach persons  in a progressive
fashion, as  an alternative to  heavier reliance on  income taxation.  The aim is to  select
commodities  and services with high income elasticity  of demand. Thus equity is attained with
"3For  example, the article by Christine Godfrey and Alan Maynard,
Economic Asnects of Tobacco Use and Taxation Policy, University of York,
Economic Reprint Series 401,  1988.- 29 -
less reliance on income taxes, which are not only more difficult to enforce in a developing
country, but may have greater adverse effects upon incentives.  Since in earlier years of
development  most of these commodities  and the inputs to make them are imported, the excises,
by lessening  use, will not only stimulate  saving, but reduce the drain on foreign exchange as
well. Compared  to a sales tax, an excise system  avoids  burden on widely  used commnodities  with
a low income elasticity  of demand, and is thus likely to be progressive, which a sales tax rarely
is.
But the "luxury" excise  systems  as they exist leave a great deal to be desired, and reflect
inherent difficulties  noted in a previous section. Except for a few obvious items such as motor
vehicles, information  on income  elasticities  is not adequate  to select  on this basis. Thus typically
the taxed items are selected on the basis of what the persons making up the list regard as
"luxuries"--without  any serious analysis. These are typically  consumer  durables. If the system
as at all broad, the result is a relatively long list of essentially  separate taxes, and in some
countries  a separate return must be filed for each excise.  The result is serious complication  of
compliance  and administration. A variety of rates if often used, with narrow differentials  that
defy logic. There may be, for example, rates of 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 percent--with  no possible
rational  explanation  of the differences. Numerous  interpretive  questions  are inevitable,  as weli
as discrimination  among  consumers  (and producers)  of closely  related commodities.
The final criticism  is that the selection  of various goods  for tax, whereas  others are not
taxed, is discriminatory  against  those persons  who have relatively  high preference  for the taxed
items and can create  excess  burden. This argument  is not significant  for traditional  or motor fuel
excises; it is for the typical range  of luxury excises. Furthermore,  in the selection  of items, not
infrequently,  ones  are included  that are either  not consumption  goods  (e.g., cement),or  are widel)
used in the lower income groups, sugar and kerosene  being the prime examples.  In some- 30 -
countries, kerosene  is the principal  fuel of the poor.  Furthermore,  the luxury excise systems  are
scarcely "systems"  at all and do not automatically  adapt to changing  conditions. New products
developed, though similar to ones now taxed, will not be brought within the tax network unless
there is deliberate action by the government.  Firms may change the nature of taxed items
slightly, bringing  them out from under the tax.
It  is  these considerations that have led  the majority of  developing, as  well as
industrialized  countries,  to introduce  sales taxes, which  reach all commodities  with few rates or
a single rate (there are exceptions)  and thus include  new products  as they are introduced. Only
a single return is required for all the commodities. There are far fewer interpretative  questions
abut whether a  particular item is taxed or  not, though there are some, centering around
exemptions.
In summary,  once a country  has developed  substantial  domestic  production  beyond  basic
agricultural  commodities  and ones subject to traditional  excises, there is great merit in moving
to a sales tax rather than continuing  to add excises. By this means  all commodities  plus selected
services  are included, both domestic  and imported, and new ones are automatically  included in
the tax net.  There are far fewer interpretative  questions,  particularly  if the list of exemptions  is
minimized. Firms need only report total sales of all taxable  items and account  for tax on them;
there is no need for separate returns for various commodities  or itemizing  sales by category of
goods. The issue of the appropriate  rate structure is beyond  the scope of this paper, but at least
a wide range of different rates can be avoided.  There is no need for registering or licensing
firms separately  for a range of separate  excises.
Typically  when a country  introduces  a sales tax, it retains  the traditional  excises,  the tax
on motor fuel, and a special levy on sales of motor vehicles. There is merit if eliminating  the
remainder  of the excises and not establishing  new ones, unless there is very strong  justification- 31 -
in particular  instances. There is little evidence  that a tax structure  can be made  more progressive
by including  excises  on a number  of so-called  luxury  goods,  just as there is no evidence  that the
use of multiple rates under a sales tax improves  progressivity. If a higher tax rate is desired  on
a few commodities,  such  as motor  vehicles,  it is likely  preferable,  from an operational  standpoint.
to reach them by a separate  excise rather than by use of higher  special rates in the sales tax.
In some countries, however, there is so little domestic manufacturing  as to make a
general sales tax scarcely worth the trouble.  In others there are political obstacles to  the
introduction  of a sales tax. Yet there is enough  domestic  production  that some form of domestic
indirect tax, beyond the traditional and motor fuel excises is warranted.  As a  second best
temporary solution, some form of  onsumption  or purchase tax, as used in the Caribbean
countries, may be warranted. But experience  in the Caribbean, Egypt, and elsewhere  suggests
that such a levy must be designed  with care, and even so is likely to be suitable  only for a few
years.  Second best optimality  requires  that the group of reasonably  homogenous  comrnodities,
as for example,  consumer  durables, be subject  to a uniform  rate, tax paid on the basis of a single
return, rather than imposing  a substantial  number  of separate levies  on different commodities,  at
different rates.  Motor vehicles constitute  such an important  and clearly definable commodity
class that different rates, based on value  or other measures,  may be warranted,  distinct from the
general levy.
ADMINISTRATION  OF EXCISE TAXES
When excises  were introduced,  assignment  of them for administration  was universally  to
Customs,  since they were similar  in nature in many respects  to customs  duties, even  though they
were collected  on domestic  transactions,  and the department  was frequently  renamed  Customs  and
Excise. As levies  were ultimately  imposed  upon  hotels, communication,  transpcrtation,  and other
services, administration  of these new ones was sometimes assigned to Customs and Excise,- 32 -
sometimes  to Inland  Revenue,  which administers  the income tax, thus splitting responsibility  for
the various forms of domestic indirect  taxes.
The administrative  structures  and procedures  for excises originated  with the traditional
levies on alcoholic  beverages  and cigarettes; for these commodities  the systems remain largely
unchanged  in developing  countries. As additional  commodities  were subjected  to excises,  initially
the same  procedures  were attempted. This proved  to be unworkable,  and thus simpler  techniques
have come to be used.
The Traditional  Techniques
Because  of the very high rates of the traditional  excises, they were particularly subject
to evasion,  and thus very strict physical  control was established,  with "physical  presence" of the
enforcement  agency.  14 There are several steps in the process:
1.  Licensing. A firm seeking  to produce  alcoholic  beverages  or tobacco must register
and apply for a license. Detailed  information  is required  about the physical  layout of the plant,
bonded warehouses,  operational  procedures,  etc.  Some countries  require annual renewal of the
license.
2.  Physical  Control of Production. Frequently  an excise  officer is stationed  in the plant
at all times, or during working hours; in other instances  the officer will make regular--often
daily--visits  to the plant. The officer  will check  the process  of production,  the entry of materials,
etc., into the plant, and the output, testing the strength as well as the quantity.  He will pay
particular attention  to all transfers of the product from the factory to the bonded warehouse  or
similar facility, and particularly  to the transfer  out of the bonded  warehouse, the point at which
14In the United Stats, rigid controls were introduced in 1866 after
an increase in the tax on distilled spirits caused the revenue to fall
in half.- 33 -
the excise becomes  payable.  No transfers can be made without  observation  by the officer.  In
some instances metering  devices are now used to check output.  The checking of strength is
mainly designed  to prevent adulteration.
3.  Record  Control. The direct physical  control  is supplemented  by records control. The
firms are required to record materials  acquisitions,  output, stock on hand, as well as details of
the production  process.
Shipments from the bonded warehouse must be accompanied  by a consignment  note
giving details of the purchaser,  etc., for each shipment,  or for each day.
4.  Payment and Returns.  In some instances  payment must be made whenever the
commodity  becomes  subject  to tax, that is, upon shipment  from the bonded warehouse,  and thus
no arrears are possible (if the procedures  are strictly followed). In other situations,  payment of
any unpaid amounts is made on a  monthly basis.  Returns giving detailed information  on
acquisitions  of materials,  output,  transfers from bonded  warehouses,  etc. are required. These are
checked against the records kept on a day-to-day  basis, but there is typically  no true audit.
The picture is complicated  by the fact that some shipments  from the bonded warehouses
are exempt from tax:  for export, for industrial  nontaxable  use, etc.  Adequate  documentation
must be provided for these--but  inevitably  they provide some avenues  of potential  leakage.  In
industrialized  countries  there is some tendency  to move away from primary reliance  on physical
controls, with emphasis  on accounts  types of controls,1 5 but most developing  countries are not
yet ready for this change; the potential  loss of revenue  is too great.
Motor Fuel Taxation. Usually  there is only one oil refinery in a developing  country, or
at most a few.  Strict physical control is neither  possible nor necessary. Returns are required,
with information  on acquisition of petroleum and sale of various petroleum products, and
indication  of sales and tax due, which must be paid with the filing of the return.
"5For  a discussion of the issues, note the study, Alcohol and
Tobacco Excise Taxes:  Laws and Audits Need Modernizina, Report by
Comptroller General of the United States, Washington, DC, 1977.- 34 -
There is a potentially  serious  problem  if diesel  fuel sold for nonhighway  use is exempted;
as noted, a refund system may be necessary  despite its complications.
Extended  Excise Systems. As countries  began  to extend  their excises  to other products,
initially  they sought  to use the same  procedures  as for the traditional  excises. But rigid physical
control proved to be impossible. With a number of different products, information  on plant
layout, etc., was difficult  to develop, and was not significant  in any event.  Notihing  equivalent
to a bonded warehouse  was possible. Tax must apply to sales, not to physical transfer.  With
a variety of products, tax almost of necessity  must be based upon amount of sales, not upon
physical unit.  When some services were made taxable, clearly physical controls could not be
used.
Accordingly,  transition to accounts control was imperative.  But there are frequently
carryovers  from the old systems. Many firms will be taxable  on several  types of products. They
must register for each type of taxable  product, with separate  registration  files. Payment  is on the
basis of returns filed monthly or at some other interval, but frequently  firms must show both
quantities  and sales figures by type  of commodity  and name of purchaser. Fig. 1 shows  a typical
return,  from  Trinidad, under the  old purchase tax  system.  The laws affecting various
commodities  may be different, with varying  requirements.  Thus firms are subject  to unnecessary
work, providing information  of which little use is made, as few governments  have systematic
audit programs for their excises.  Even the follow-up systems for ascertaining  and pursuing
nonfilers  are usually  inadequate.
The tendency of  countries to shift from these broad excise systems to sales taxes
eliminates these problems in larger measure. If a few luxury excises  are retained, such as on
motor vehicles, these can be administered  separately  from the sales tax or in conjunction  with it;
the complications  are largely  eliminated  once most luxury excises  are emerged  into the sales tax.CUSTOMS  AND EXCISE  DIVISION  PURCHASE  TAX  ASSESSMENT  C. A L.-r.T.-3&
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Lesotho  lfrica  370  1986  230946  5518  865  6383  2.76%
Kenya  Africa  330  1988  29176  2573  531  3104  10.64%
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Japan  Asia  15760  1988  49024  7114  96  7210  14.71%
Kuwaat  Asia  14610  1989  84  0  0  0  0.00%
Australia  Asia  11100  1988  73707  10285  49  10334  14.02%
Singapore  Asia  7940  1988  7519  544  430  974  12.95%
New  Zealand  Asia  7750  1990  30341  2381  85  2466  8.13%
Israel  Asia  6800  1989  29420.6  840.7  840.7  2.86%
Oman  Asia  5810  1989  312.4  0  0  0  0.00%
Korea, Rep.  Asia  2690  1990  23262  2778  281  3059  13.15%
Malaysia  Asia  1810  1990  20088  2044  0  2044  10.18%
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Jordan  Asia  1560  1988  321.99  61.17  61.17  19.00%
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Ymem  Arab Reb.  Lsia  590  1990  11740.4  2302.5  4.1  2306.6  19.65%
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Indoesia  Asia  450  1988  21436  1390  1390  6.48%
Solann Isda3ds  kAia  420  1988  72.76  O.S3  0  0.53  0.73%
Sri  LanIM  Asia  400  1990  55920  7780  0  7780  13.91%
Paiksltan  lsia  350  1986  69323  25052  0  2S052  36.14%
India  Asia  300  1989  508.76  228.8  0.39  229.19  4S.OS%
Maldlvew  Asia  300  1989  271.8  0  84  84  30.91%
Niepal  AsIa  160  1990  7235.6  1045.2  249.6  1294.S  17.89%
Bangladab  Asia  160  1988  43274  11667  0  11667  26.96%
Swlt2erland  Europ  21330  1988  54264  1627  211  183  3.39%
Luxer  bourg  Europe  18550  1988  111622  11237  792  12029  10.78%
Norway  Europe  17190  1989  218603  3S338  1572  36910  16.88%
Iceland  Europ  16600  1987  4629S.6  2762.2  199.1  2961.3  6.40%
Sweden  Europe  15550  1989  458.45  50.83  1.99  52.82  11.52%
Denark  Europe  14930  1989  266164  32139  1564  33703  12.66%
Finland  Eur-.e  14470  1988  125777  19596  44  19640  15.61%
Germny, Fed.  Rep.  Europ  14400  1989  618.92  56.82  4.19  61.01  9.86%
France  Europe  12790  1989  2318.3  153.4  47.4  200.8  8.66%
Austria  Europe  11980  1989  529.28  37.26  10.05  47.31  8.94%
Netherlands  Eurmp  11860  1989  209.82  11.52  0  11.52  5.49%
selgia  Euope  11480  1988  2388.9  115.1  18.7  133.8  5.60%
united  Kingdcm  Europe  10420  1989  163917  21381  2915  24296  14.82%
Italy  Europe  10350  1989  436871  30407  5103  35510  8.13%
Ireland  Europe  6120  1988  8481  1447  112  1S59  18.38%
Spain  Europ  6010  1987  10283.7  709.5  73.2  782.7  7.61%
Cyprus  Europe  5200  1989  510.54  77.4  8.92  86.32  16.91%
Malta  Europe  4190  1988  150.4  5.81  0.24  6.05  4.027.
Greece  Europe  4020  1985  1483.38  228.81  5.1  233.91  15.77%
Portugpl  Europe  2830  1988  1945.7  308.1  78.5  386.6  19.87%
Turkey  Europe  1210  1989  25572.1  675.4  1299.9  197S.3  7.72%
United  States  N & C Arica  18S30  1989  963.16  26.36  6.48  32.84  3.41%
Canada  N & C hmrica  15160  1989  115857  6775  931  7706  6.65%
Bahama  N & C Amrica  10280  1986  373.2  0  27.7  27.7  7.42%
Barbados  N & C Amxdca  5350  1988  959.8  5.3  38.4  43.7  4.55%
Trinidad &  Tobago  N & C  damlca  4210  1989  4072.6  397.7  397.7  9.77%
Paa  N & C Am3rIca  2240  1988  817  79.1  8.3  87.4  10.70%
M1xico  N  C Amica  1830  1990  88965  8610  1410  10020  11.26%
St.  Kitts  &  Mevis  N & C Amdca  1700  1989  92.46  2.11  2.51  4.62  5.00%
Costa  Rica  N  & C AmIca  1610  1989  89.21  7.57  0.39  7.96  8.92%
St.  Lucia  N  C imrica  1400  1990  264  1  10.7  11.7  4.43%
Belize  N & C Irdca  1240  1984  82S93  7024  329  7353  8.90%
St.  Vinnt  & tbe Grnadi  & C Amrica  1000  1989  110.2  1.2  12  13.2  11.98%
Guateala  N & C America  950  1989  1853.75  194.73  17.61  212.34  11.45%
Ja4ca  N & C Ameica  940  1984  2614.2  S32.8  80.5  613.3  23.46%
El Salvador  N  &  C lAmica  860  1989  2509.9  429.4  22  451.4  17.98%
Nicaragua  N & C 3-rica  830  1988  66121  25642  0  2S642  38.78%
Docinlca  Rep.  N & C AmrIca  730  1988  4019.3  757.8  116.4  874.2  21.75%
Haiti  N & C  aelIca  360  1987  994.9  274.8  22.9  297.7  29.92%
Veneela  S Amrica  3230  1986  88853  9138  76  9214  10.37%
Argentina  S Amrica  2390  1988  94110  1S201  137  16572  17.61%
Surinam  S America  2270  1986  375.19  24.54  4.53  29.07  7.75%- 38  -
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Urusgay  S I-rica  d190  1988  625674  87721  655  88376  14.12%
Brazil  S Aerica  2020  1988  12704.3  2232.4  597.3  2829.7  22.277
Peru  S A-rica  1470  1989  7165  1935  111  2046  28.56%
Chile  S Amrica  1310  1988  1164.77  122.54  122.54  10.52%
Colobia  S America  1240  1987  1005.6  59.6  2  61.6  6.13%
Ecuadr  S  Amrica  1040  1988  398407  16470  962  17432  4.38%
Paraguay  S Amuica  990  1988  281734  52131  2066  54197  19.24%
Bolivia  S lmerica  580  1989  1019.2  190.1  190.1  18.65%
Guyana  S krica  390  1985  807.6  52.4  7.3  59.7  7.39%
Source:  International  Nonetary Fund, Financial  Statistics  Yearbook 1990.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Serles
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